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they take. Part II of this Article discusses the implications of the jurisprudence on borrowers,
bankruptcy trustees, and lenders.
I.

The “Splitting-the-Note” Argument
The “splitting-the-note” theory posits that transferring a mortgage or deed of trust “by

way of MERS ‘splits’ the note from the [mortgage or] deed of trust, thus rendering both null.”5
Borrowers and bankruptcy trustees have asserted this theory in an attempt to avoid a mortgage or
a deed of trust. However, as discussed below, while not an exhaustive list of all the reported and
unreported cases regarding the issue, the following four cases from Georgia, Massachusetts,
Texas, and Virginia illustrate the typical reasoning courts apply when rejecting this argument.
a. Georgia Law
For example, in In re Corley,6 a bankruptcy court in Georgia rejected the splitting-thenote argument and held that a note was fully secured because (1) the security deed was properly
perfected at its inception; (2) despite the note and security deed being physically separated,
“there was neither contractual language nor any statutory provision which stripped the security
from the debt”; (3) the post-petition assignment of the security deed did not violate the automatic
stay; and (4) the security deed designated MERS as grantee of the security deed.7
In Corley, the debtors took out a loan from and executed a note in favor of Citizens Bank
of Effingham (“CBE”) to purchase real property.8 The debtors executed a security deed to
secure the note.9 The security deed, which was recorded in the county land records,10 named
MERS “as grantee and nominee for CBE and its successors.”11 The security deed also granted
5

Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 722 F.3d 249, 254 (5th Cir. 2013).
447 B.R. 375.
7
Id. at 380.
8
Id. at 378.
9
Id. at 379.
10
Id. at 378.
11
Id. at 377.
6
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MERS “the right to foreclose and sell the [p]roperty” for CBE and any of CBE’s successors and
assigns.12 The note was subsequently transferred numerous times, “with different entities taking
possession, ownership, and servicing rights.”13 Similarly, the security deed was “transferred at
least once.”14 On or about April 29, 2009, almost three months after the debtors filed for
bankruptcy, MERS transferred the security deed to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”).15
In August of 2009, Ocwen became the servicer of the loan.16 Ultimately, after numerous
transfers, the note and the security deed were physically united in Ocwen’s possession.17
After the debtors filed for bankruptcy, the chapter 7 trustee “commenced an adversary
proceeding to determine the extent, validity, and priority of the [s]ecurity [d]eed, asserting that
the [n]ote was unsecured.”18 The trustee challenged the note and security deed on three principal
grounds. First, the trustee argued that the note was unsecured because the note and the security
deed were split. The trustee alleged “that the ‘split’ occurred because MERS (the security
holder) did not hold the [n]ote” and Ocwen did not hold the security deed.19 Second, the trustee
argued “that the post-petition transfer of the [n]ote and the [s]ecurity [d]eed violated the
automatic stay.”20 Third, the trustee argued that MERS could not be the “grantee” in the security
deed because MERS did not receive payments for the loan on behalf of a grantor, and therefore,
the security deed was unenforceable.21
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Id. at 378.
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Id. at 382.
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Id. at 379.
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Id. at 381.
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The Corley court rejected the trustee’s arguments. First, the Corley court held that the
note was secured.22 Under Georgia law, which applied here, the court noted that when a security
deed is transferred, “the accompanying indebtedness” also transfers.23 Therefore, transferring
the security deed did not as a matter of law split the security deed and the note.24 While they
were physically separated, “there was neither contractual language nor any statutory provision
which stripped the security from the debt.”25 The Corley court concluded that the note was fully
secured for three additional reasons: (1) the security deed “was properly perfected at its
inception” since it was “recorded in the county where the land conveyed [was] located”;26 (2) the
security deed was never released or cancelled since the debtors had not paid the debt in full nor
did they produce a cancelled security deed;27 and (3) the security deed language, naming MERS
as nominee, created an agency relationship.28
Second, the Corley court held that the post-petition transfer of the note and the security
deed29 did not violate the automatic stay “because at the at the time of the transfer, the “debtors’
only interests in the [p]roperty were the right of possession and the right to have the [s]ecurity
[d]eed reconveyed upon repayment,” and thus “they had no interest in the [s]ecurity [d]eed itself
at the time of [the] post-petition transfer.”30 The Corley court explained that when the debtors
executed a security deed to MERS, they conveyed legal title, which could only be reconveyed
back to the debtors when they paid the note in full.31 Third, the Corley court held that MERS
was a grantee in the security deed because “plain and clear” language in the security deed
22

See id. at 383–85.
Id. at 383.
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Id.
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Id. at 380, 383.
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Id. at 380–81.
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Id.
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See id. at 381.
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Id. at 379.
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Id. at 385.
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See id.
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designated MERS as grantee of the security deed and nominee for the lender on the note.32
Additionally, the security deed provided that MERS, as grantee, retained the right to enforce the
note regardless of who the noteholder was at any given point.33 Therefore, the Corley court held
that the note was fully secured, and thus enforceable.34
b. Massachusetts Law
Similarly, in In re D’Alessandro,35 a bankruptcy court in Massachusetts held that one of
the two mortgages against the debtor’s home was not void even though (1) MERS, in its role as
nominee of the original lender, only held the mortgage, but not the note that the mortgage
secured; (2) the original lender no longer held the note; and (3) the servicer of the note and
mortgage did not hold an assignment of the note and mortgage.36
In D’Alessandro, the debtors took out a loan from and executed a note in favor of GB
Mortgage, LLC (“GB”) in order to purchase real property.37 The debtors’ obligations under the
note were secured by a mortgage granted to MERS as GB’s nominee.38 Subsequently, GB
dissolved.39 After the debtors filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against the debtors, GB, and GMAC Mortgage,
LLC (“GMAC”), seeking, among other things, a determination that the mortgage was void.40
The trustee alleged that both the note and the mortgage may have been assigned to GMAC or

32

Id. at 381.
Id. at 383.
34
See id. at 385–86.
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2013 WL 1385745 (Bankr. D. Mass. Apr. 4, 2013).
36
See id. at *4.
37
Id. at *1.
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Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at *4.
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that GMAC might have been servicing the note.41 However, the assignment of the mortgage had
not been recorded.42
The chapter 7 trustee commenced an adversary proceeding to determine the extent,
validity, and priority of the mortgage, asserting that it was unenforceable.43

The trustee

challenged the mortgage on two grounds.44 First, the trustee argued that the mortgage was void
because MERS did not hold the note, and instead, only held the mortgage.45 Second, the trustee
argued that “there [was] no recorded mortgage assignment.”46
The D’Alessandro court rejected the trustee’s two arguments asserting that the mortgage
was invalid.47 First, the D’Alessandro court held the mortgage was valid even if the mortgage
had been split from the note.48 In particular, the court reasoned that unless the debtors had paid
the note in full, the obligations arising under the note still existed.49 The D’Alessandro court also
noted that Massachusetts law provides that “other than in the foreclosure context, ‘the holder of
the note and mortgage may be different persons.’”50

Therefore, the D’Alessandro court

concluded that unless and until MERS seeks to foreclose its mortgage, MERS does not have to
hold the note “unless it [is] acting on its own behalf rather than as the agent of the noteholder.”51
Second, the D’Alessandro court held that “except in the foreclosure context,” a mortgage need
not be recorded in order to be effective.52 However, the D’Alessandro court noted that recording

41

Id. at *1.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *4–5.
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See id. at *4.
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Id. at *5.
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See id. at *4–5.
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Id. at *4.
49
See id.
50
Id. (quoting In re Marron, 455 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011)).
51
Id.
52
Id. at *5.
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mortgage assignments is encouraged.53

Therefore, the D’Alessandro court held that the

mortgage was not void.54
c. Texas Law
The Fifth Circuit, in Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P.,55 affirmed a district
court, which held that foreclosure was proper, rejecting the borrower’s argument that combined
the “splitting-the-note” theory and the “show-me-note” theory.56

In Martins, the borrower

refinanced his home mortgage with BSM Financial (“BSM”) in 2003.57 The borrower executed
a mortgage to secure his obligations under the note, which named MERS “as the beneficiary and
nominee for BSM and its assigns.”58 In 2010, MERS assigned the mortgage to BAC and
recorded the transfer.59 In 2011, after the borrower defaulted under the note, BAC foreclosed on
his home.60
Following the foreclosure, the borrower “sued [BAC] in state court, claiming wrongful
foreclosure, promissory estoppel, and negligent misrepresentations.”61

Specifically, the

borrower claimed “that the note was not properly transferred to BAC” and that MERS’s
assignment to BAC “was ‘robosigned’ and therefore ‘forged.’”62 The borrower claimed that as a
result, BAC could not foreclose on his home because it neither held the note nor owned the
mortgage.63 However, the court rejected this claim, holding that the mortgage assignment from

53

See id.
See id.
55
722 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2013).
56
See id. at 256.
57
Id. at 252
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MERS to BAC was valid because the assignment document was signed, notarized, and recorded
in the county land records.64
BAC removed to federal court and moved for summary judgment.65 The district court
granted BAC’s summary judgment motion.66 The borrower then appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s ruling.67
The borrower argued that when MERS assigned only the mortgage to BAC, which “split
the note from the deed of trust,” and therefore precluded BAC from foreclosing because it “had a
meaningless piece of paper rather than a debt on which it could foreclose.”68 The court noted
that this argument merged two common theories, the “show-me-the-note” theory and the
“splitting-the-note” theory.69 The court rejected the “show-me-the-note” theory, which posits
that in order to foreclose, “a party must produce the original note bearing a ‘wet ink
signature.’”70 This theory is unsuccessful under Texas law, which permits a mortgagee to
foreclose without possessing the original note, as long as the mortgagee produces a photocopy of
the original note and “an affidavit in which the affiant swears that the photocopy is a true and
correct copy of the original note.”71 The court also rejected the “splitting-the-note” theory,
which posits that when a note and a deed of trust are split, both are void.72 The theory further
posits that “[i]n order to foreclose . . . a party must hold both the note and the deed of trust.”73
This theory is also unsuccessful under Texas law, which permits a mortgagee to foreclose

64

Id.
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 253.
69
See id.
70
Id. (citation omitted).
71
Id. at 253–54.
72
Id. at 254.
73
Id.
65
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without holding or owning the note.74 And since MERS qualified as a mortgagee, MERS was
permitted to foreclose without holding or owning the note.75 Therefore, BAC was also permitted
to foreclose without holding or owning the note because the assignment from MERS to BAC
“explicitly included the power to foreclose by the deed of trust.”76
d. Virginia Law
The Fourth Circuit, in Tapia v. U.S. Bank,77 affirmed a district court, which held that
MERS was authorized to foreclose on the borrowers’ property pursuant to the deed of trust.78 In
Tapia, the borrowers took out two loans from and executed two notes in favor of First Savings
Mortgage Corporation to purchase real property.79 The borrowers executed two deeds of trust to
secure their obligations under the notes.80 Both deeds of trust named MERS as the beneficiary.81
Each of the deeds of trust provided, in relevant part:
Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests
granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with
law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and
assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of these interests, including, but not
limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action
required of Lender including, but not limited to releasing and canceling this
Security Instrument.82
The deeds of trust also provided that the note could be sold without notifying borrower.83
The borrowers claimed that only the lender could foreclose on the property.84 However,
the court rejected this argument because, as noted above, the deed of trust “authorized MERS to

74

See id. at 255.
See id.
76
Id.
77
718 F. Supp. 2d 689 (E.D. Va. 2010), aff’d, 441 Fed. Appx. 166 (4th Cir. 2011).
78
718 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 693.
82
Id. at 693.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 696.
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foreclose [and sell] the [p]roperty” if the borrowers defaulted on their loan.85 Indeed, the
borrowers agreed to this when they signed the deeds of trust.86 Therefore, MERS was authorized
to foreclose on the borrowers’ property.87
“There is No Such Thing as a ‘Free House’”88

II.

The decisions discussed above rejecting the “splitting-the-note” theory are particularly
important because MERS “hold[s] title to roughly half of all the home mortgages in the
nation.”89

If courts accepted the “splitting-the-note” argument, borrowers and bankruptcy

trustees would arguably be unjustly enriched because such borrowers would essentially receive a
free house even though they originally agreed to grant a mortgage securing their obligations
under the note they executed in connection therewith. If a court were to adopt the rule that a
third party, such as MERS, could not hold and enforce a mortgage or a deed of trust on the
lender’s behalf, it would likely lead to a substantial increase in litigation seeking to invalidate the
mortgage or deed of trust since, as noted above, MERS holds title to so many mortgages.
Therefore, adopting the proposed rule under the “splitting-the-note” theory could result in
millions of home loans becoming unsecured loans,90 which in turn would threaten the lender’s
recovery if the borrower defaults.
Yet, since the courts have consistently rejected these arguments, borrowers and
bankruptcy trustees should be aware that it is extremely unlikely that they will be able to
invalidate the mortgage against a borrower’s home on the basis that the mortgage designates a
third party, such as MERS, as mortgagee even though the mortgagee does not hold the note.
85

Id. at 697.
Id.
87
Id. at 692.
88
In re Marron, 455 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011).
89
Michael Powell & Gretchen Morgenson, MERS, the Mortgage Holder You Might Know, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12,
2014, 11:46 PM), http://www nytimes.com/2011/03/06/business/06mers html?pagewanted=all.
90
See In re Cash, 2013 WL 1191745 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2013).
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Conclusion
Many borrowers and bankruptcy trustees have attempted to avoid home mortgages or
deeds of trust under the “splitting-the-note” theory, asserting that they are unenforceable.
Courts, however, have repeatedly rejected this argument because it is permissible to designate a
third party as mortgagee to act on behalf of a noteholder. Thus, future borrowers and bankruptcy
trustees will likely be unsuccessful in avoiding a mortgage under the “splitting-the-note” theory.
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